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There are two primary but different methods of controlling behavior, 
whether it is the behavior of individuals or corporations: to incentivize it 
or to regulate it.  Governments are in a unique position to employ either 
or both options because of their ability to pass regulatory schemes and to 
extend tax incentives.  This Article analyzes the two methods of shaping 
corporate behavior, examining the regulation issue through the case of the 
conflict minerals provision of the Dodd–Frank Act and examining the 
taxation issue through several examples of corporate tax incentives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An extensive network of laws, including tax incentives, aims to 
increase corporate efforts toward socially desirable goals.  Although 
there has been a significant debate in the literature regarding the 
appropriateness or even possibility of corporate social responsibility 
given the corporate structure,1 the federal government has continued to 
seek increasing corporate social responsibility through the reach of its 
laws.2   
There are several areas in which global companies have been 
encouraged to exhibit increased corporate social responsibility.  These 
include labor standards, environmental stewardship,3 and recognition of 
human rights,4 with implications for important issues like global poverty, 
eradication of worldwide diseases, and reduction of violence in conflict 
regions.5  Corporate social responsibility may entail promotion of ethical 
guidelines, incorporation of stakeholder concerns, and efficient 
internalization of externalized costs.6  This differs from corporate 
accountability, which includes internal monitoring mechanisms, 
transparency, and disclosure.7    
There are two primary but different methods of controlling 
behavior, whether it is the behavior of individuals or corporations: to 
incentivize it or to regulate it.  Governments are in a unique position to 
employ either or both options because of their ability to pass regulatory 
 
1.  “For centuries legal, political, social, and economic commentators have debated 
corporate social responsibility ad nauseam.”  Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why 
They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual 
Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
2.  This coincides, or may be prompted, by an increased call by society for corporate 
social responsibility.  “The growing popularity of corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’) is 
premised on the belief that modern corporations have the financial resources, human capital, 
and global influence to advance progressive causes.”  Aaron K. Chatterji & Barak D. 
Richman, Understanding the “Corporate” in Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 33, 33 (2008).  
3.  See, e.g., Cherie Metcalf, Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Public Law: Third 
Party Rankings as Regulation by Information, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 145, 146 (2010).  
Environmental stewardship includes matters such as “environmentally responsible products 
and production methods, responsiveness to community concerns, recycling, conservation, 
waste management practices, and energy conservation.”  Id. at 151. 
4.  See id. at 150.  
5.  See Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 33. 
6.  Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 452, 458, 461 (2008). 
7.  Id. at 458, 461.  Gill suggests that corporate social responsibility and corporate 
accountability are merging.  Id. 
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schemes and to extend tax incentives.  The question, therefore, arises 
whether desirable corporate behavior should be incentivized or 
regulated. 
This Article analyzes why legislators may choose to incentivize 
versus regulate corporate behavior, examining the issue through the 
case of the conflict minerals provision in the Dodd–Frank Act.  
Accordingly, Part II examines the goals and effectiveness of mandated 
corporate social responsibility, using recent conflict minerals legislation 
as a case study.  Part III analyzes the alternative of incentivization, 
focusing on tax regulation.  Finally, Part IV compares the two methods 
of controlling corporate behavior, seeking a framework governing their 
uses. 
II. REGULATING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 
Corporations deal with numerous regulations every day, including 
regulations aimed at requiring good corporate citizenship or social 
responsibility.  These regulations, often tailored to corporations in 
particular industries, regularly are in tension with the overriding 
corporate priority of maximizing profit for shareholders.  Positive law 
plays a major role in establishing standards and boundaries for 
corporate behavior.  In addition, a number of regulations aimed at 
increasing corporate social responsibility require corporate disclosure of 
behavior, with the result that consumers and the market force shifts in 
corporate behavior.  Both avenues of directing corporate behavior have 
benefits and drawbacks but represent the wide range of tools the 
government has in shaping corporate behavior and encouraging 
corporate social responsibility.   
A. Positive Law Governing Corporate Social Responsibility  
Promoting and mandating corporate social responsibility through 
regulation is not a new concept.8  However, corporate social 
responsibility is often considered a moral imperative rather than a 
regulatory one.9  As such, efforts to regulate corporate social 
 
8.  See, e.g., David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (1979). 
9.  Case Study: Corporate Social Responsibility in the US, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Mar. 21, 
2011), http://www.triplepundit.com/2011/03/case-study-corporate-social-responsibility/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/UA28-UFDY/ (claiming that corporate social responsibility 
regulations are framed as a social and moral choice).  Notably, many industries in the United 
States are not as heavily regulated as their European counterparts.  Id.; see also Jan Wouters 
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responsibility are often based upon a particular issue or social cause and 
are often met with resistance from those who do not consider the 
particular issue to be paramount.10  For that reason, there exists a 
patchwork of corporate social responsibility regulations as a result of the 
various resources and lobbying efforts made on behalf of particular 
social goals.11   
For example, one of the most prominent areas of corporate social 
responsibility has been in the field of environmental law and practices.  
This is in large part due to the fact that the history of the corporate 
social responsibility movement parallels the environmental movement.12  
As the Earth Day movement came about in 1970, so too arose the 
populist cry for corporations to enlist in solving some of society’s 
problems, given the seemingly vast amount of corporate resources and 
the perception that corporations played a significant role in many of 
society’s environmental ills.13  
Through resulting environmental regulations and the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to police environmental 
 
& Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 NW. U. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 262 (2008) (discussing the regulatory and voluntary approaches to corporate 
social responsibility and addressing corporate efforts related to international human rights 
issues); see also Laura Albareda et al., The Changing Role of Governments in Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Drivers and Responses, 17 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 347 (2008) 
(describing government’s role in regulating corporate social responsibility in three European 
countries—Italy, the United Kingdom, and Norway—that all employ different approaches). 
10.  See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1432–33 (2006); see also Douglas M. Branson, Corporate 
Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1221 (2002) (noting that corporate social 
responsibility is regulated by a variety of statutes and regulatory bodies, including the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, the Community Reinvestment Act, the Freedom of Information 
Act, and Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA)). 
11.  See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 643 (2001); see also Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Financial Institutions: Beyond Dodd–Frank, BANKING & FIN. 
SERVICES POL’Y REP., Jan. 2012, at 13, 15 (“Many financial institutions choose from several 
initiatives to satisfy corporate social responsibility goals: the elimination of poverty, human 
rights, workplace diversity, philanthropic contributions, community outreach, and 
environmental sustainability.”). 
12.  Branson, supra note 11, at 611.  The discussion over the role of the corporation in 
general has been around since at least the 1930s, however.  As early as 1932, Adolf Berle and 
E. Merrick Dodd debated whether the corporation’s purpose was solely for profit 
maximization or whether the corporation also should hold social and community 
responsibilities.  See, e.g., A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A 
Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
13.  Branson, supra note 11, at 611.   
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regulations, corporations were required to increase their corporate 
social responsibility as related to the environment.14  Through the 
positive law of environmental regulations, corporate social responsibility 
is not merely encouraged but mandated through threat of governmental 
sanction.  That is, corporations are liable to the government, as well as 
at risk for potential shareholder derivative suits, if they do not comply 
with federal and state environmental laws.15 
Likewise, other statutory provisions require corporate social 
responsibility in the area of human rights.  For example, the Alien Tort 
Claims Act allows private rights of action against multinational 
corporations committing human rights abuses abroad.16  Thus, although 
corporations with overseas operations may not encounter direct U.S. 
government oversight abroad, they still face the potential of private 
lawsuits for human rights abuses.   
Another avenue by which the government regulates corporate 
actions requires companies to comply with various corporate social 
responsibility measures before being granted licenses for various 
business activities.17  This method is used in these contexts as a 
regulatory tool.   
 
14.  Terra Pfund, Corporate Environmental Accountability: Expanding SEC Disclosures 
to Promote Market-Based Environmentalism, 11 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 118 (2004) 
(discussing the EPA’s role in ensuring corporate compliance with environmental protection 
laws and arguing for regulation). 
15.  One need not look any further than the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico to see 
the potential ramifications of violating environmental laws.  BP faces lawsuits from the 
government, as well as private civil claims.  Margaret Cronin Fisk & Jef Feeley, BP Found 
Grossly Negligent in 2010 Gulf of Mexico Spill, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 4, 2014, 7:18 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-04/bp-found-grossly-negligent-in-2010-gulf-
of-mexico-spill, archived at http://perma.cc/PA89-TYPD.  The environmental disaster put a 
spotlight on existing environmental laws, with many arguing for increased measures to hold 
corporations accountable.  See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: 
Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 
85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 1033–34 (2011) (discussing regulatory reforms under Dodd–Frank that 
benefit environmental concerns). 
16.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The 
Commensurability of Corporate Profits and Human Rights, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 141, 159–65 (2012); Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort 
Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 635 (2004) (analyzing lawsuits brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act against 
multinational corporations for alleged human rights violations and the resulting effect).  
17.  Gill, supra note 6, at 469–70.  Gill cites the policies and actions of administrative 
agencies like the SEC, OSHA, and EPA that, for example, “grant business licenses and 
permissions conditioned upon integrity and disclosure performance, [enforce] whistleblower 
protections, [provide] government-sponsored auditing schemes and tax incentives, and use[] a 
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Requiring corporate compliance with various normative regulations 
aimed at shoring up corporate social responsibility is the most direct 
governmental influence on corporate behavior due to the threat of 
sanction.  Also providing an important tool for governments in 
regulating corporate behavior are regulations requiring disclosure, as 
described in more depth below.  
B. Disclosure Requirements 
In addition to governmental and private rights of action for 
violations of statutorily mandated corporate social responsibility, 
corporations are held to socially responsible standards through various 
regulations requiring corporate disclosure.18  For public companies, 
disclosure occurs on a regular basis and must include any information 
deemed material, as well as any information that is statutorily required 
to be disclosed.19   For example, companies must make initial disclosures 
when new securities are issued to the public.20  Thereafter, public 
companies must make periodic disclosures quarterly and annually.21  
Disclosures are also required regarding elections at annual shareholder 
meetings,22 as well as when any major corporate event takes place, such 
as a merger or sale of the business.23 
Disclosures unrelated to corporate financial stability and instead 
aimed at providing investors with information regarding various social 
 
company’s implementation of a compliance program as a basis for sentencing guidelines” as 
meta-regulation related to corporate social responsibility.  Id. at 469–70. 
18.  Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).  In this article, Williams outlines that 
the SEC has the statutory authority in fashioning proxy disclosure to require disclosure either 
to promote the public interest or to protect investors.  Id. at 1199; see also Jeff Civins & Mary 
Mendoza, Corporate Sustainability and Social Responsibility: A Legal Perspective, 71 TEX. 
B.J. 368, 370–71 (2008).  Civins and Mendoza discuss how specific SEC regulations regarding 
corporate reporting may impact corporate social responsibility in the environmental realm, 
noting the difference between mandatory reporting and laws governing truth in disclosures.  
Id.  But see Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an 
Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 616 (2006) 
(querying whether “the First Amendment shield[s] politically tinged corporate speech from 
the compelled disclosure and reporting requirements embedded in the U.S. securities laws”). 
19.  . See Securities Act of 1933 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)).  
20.  See id. §§ 5, 7, 10 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77g, 77j). 
21.  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12, 13, 15D (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78l, 78m, 78o-6). 
22.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 14(f), 15 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78-n(f), 78o). 
23.  Id. § 14 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-n). 
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responsibility issues are becoming more prevalent.24  Regulations 
requiring additional disclosure often are enacted after a precipitating 
event pressured Congress to tighten up its regulatory scheme in relation 
to corporations.  For example, the collapse of Enron and WorldCom 
ushered in the era of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–
Oxley).25  Likewise, Congress reacted to the financial crisis of 2008 by 
enacting sweeping financial reforms in the form of the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–
Frank).26  Although both Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank were 
corporate regulations aimed at increasing financial stability, both Acts 
also included disclosure requirements aimed at enhancing corporate 
social responsibility.27  In addition, there are numerous regulations 
promulgated by discrete agencies regulating particular industries that 
require disclosure to ensure compliance, such as the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection 
 
24.  The disclosure regime required by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 is premised on the notion that disclosure allows for both investor 
protection and an adequate valuation of securities.  Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and 
Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 145–46 (2006) (“The emphasis in securities law on 
providing information to the public is premised on the belief that individuals are rational, self-
governing actors who are willing and able to process the information wisely.  If we assume 
that investors are rational risk calculators who are consistently capable of weighing the costs 
and benefits of risky alternatives and selecting the best option, then a system of disclosure 
makes good sense.”).  For publicly traded companies, disclosure requirements are triggered if 
the company learns of any material information, defined as information that would factor into 
a reasonable investor’s investment decision.  See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
231–32 (1988).  With additional non-financial disclosure requirements being statutorily 
mandated, there is an ongoing debate that Congress and regulating agencies are requiring 
disclosure of non-material information, rendering the concept of materiality to be more of a 
check-the-box requirement rather than a qualitative, common law concept.  See, e.g., Karen 
E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and 
Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 (2012). 
25.  Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); 
see Mark A. Buchanan, Social Contract, Corporate Social Responsibility, Counsel and the ISO 
26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility, ADVOCATE, Oct. 2009, at 17, 18 (“The Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 also can be seen as a modification of the social contract in that it increases 
the duties owed to stakeholders in terms of corporate governance.”). 
26.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S. Code). 
27.  For example, as discussed in Part II.D, Dodd–Frank included disclosure 
requirements related to conflict minerals.  In addition, Dodd–Frank required disclosures 
related to legal payments made abroad by companies in the extractive industries, as well as 
disclosures related to mine safety—all of which are unrelated to the underlying financial goals 
of the Act.  Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1502–1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–22 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p)–(q), 78m-2). 
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Agency, and Health and Human Services.28  Even if some disclosure 
requirements do not carry strict penalties related to the content of the 
disclosure, the fact of mandated disclosure forces companies to focus on 
performing due diligence and remaining in compliance with 
regulations.29 
C. The Use of Market Forces  
Socially responsible corporate behavior can be induced also by 
threat of a negative market reaction.30  A decline in brand recognition or 
a blow to a corporation’s reputation affects a corporation’s bottom line 
and can be as effective a threat to encourage corporate social 
responsibility as any government mandate.31  More and more, 
consumers demand products that are made in socially responsible ways 
and corporations that act in socially responsible ways.32  In doing so, 
consumers create market forces that pressure companies into acting 
responsibly.33   
There is a tension within corporate management between catering to 
customers in order to preserve brand reputation and maximizing profits 
 
28.  See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1904 (2014); 40 C.F.R. § 61.153 (2014); 21 C.F.R. § 201.62 
(2014). 
29.  For example, companies that must make conflict mineral disclosures may state in 
their disclosure that they use conflict minerals, without any threat of SEC sanction.  Cf. 
Dodd–Frank Act, § 1502 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)).  However, the fact 
that the company has to perform due diligence and be aware of supply chain issues is a step 
towards additional corporate social responsibility.  
30.  See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality 
and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial 
Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 184 (2007) (“Brand reputation, among other business 
incentives, drives companies to manage areas that lie beyond regulatory compliance and 
tangible financial relevance.”). 
31.  See id.; Ribstein, supra note 10, at 1452–56, 1459.  But see Jason Scott Johnston, 
Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market Incentives for 
Corporate Environmental Performance (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper 
No. 05-16, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=725103,  archived  at  http://perma.cc/D5
H6-W9V3 (arguing that, in the absence of mandatory disclosure, most firms will engage only 
in “cheap talk” that does not permit meaningful comparisons between firms in an industry). 
32.  See, e.g., Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 48; see also Williams, supra note 18, 
at 1199 (explaining that there is an “affirmative case for expanded corporate social 
transparency and for the SEC’s legitimate role in promoting such transparency, both from the 
perspective of the ‘economic’ investor . . . and from the perspective of the ‘social’ investor, 
who is concerned more broadly with the social and environmental effects of corporate 
conduct”).  
33.  See Rob Harrison, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Consumer Movement, 13 
CONSUMER POL’Y REV. 127, 128 (2003). 
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for shareholders.34  In fact, one of the predominant views in the debate 
over the role of corporate social responsibility is that of “shareholder 
primacy,” whereby corporate managers “recognize the importance of 
corporations serving the interests of society as a whole,”35 but only to 
the extent that any mandatory corporate social responsibilities are 
embodied in positive law, as described in Part II.A.  In other words, the 
shareholder primacy theory holds that corporate managers have no 
social responsibility beyond profit maximization for shareholders, within 
the contours of existing laws.36  A stark view of this theory would posit 
that corporations take on social responsibility when they do what they 
do best—contribute to the economy by creating employment 
opportunities, providing goods and services, and generating tax 
revenue.37 
Juxtaposed with the shareholder primacy theory is that of 
stakeholder primacy.38  Stakeholder primacy is a predominantly 
progressive theory that espouses the view that corporate managers have 
an underlying social obligation to stakeholders including employees, 
consumers, the environment, and the larger community.39   
 
34.  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the 
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005).  This article discusses the economic and social 
benefits of limiting corporate profits in the public interest and the existing limits on 
managerial discretion to limit shareholder profits.  Id.  The author concludes that 
“[m]anagerial discretion to sacrifice corporate profits is both inevitable and affirmatively 
desirable.”  Id. at 868. 
35.  Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic 
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 713 (2002).  
36.  See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).  Friedman, 
of course, is essentially the godfather of conservative and libertarian economic theory, 
positing that government should not play a role in regulating business or labor practices 
because government intervention undermines the capitalistic structure of the economy.  See 
id. at 22–27.  Friedman, however, did not advocate for profit maximization though illegal or 
unethical methods.  Id. at 133. 
37.  See Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility 
into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 655–65 (2009) (outlining various 
methods and devices for deviating from profit maximization, including (1) the business 
judgment rule, (2) fiduciary duties, and (3) shareholder proposals).  Choudhury also considers 
that market forces would motivate a corporation to engage in corporate social responsibility.  
See id. at 648–55.  
38.  Williams, supra note 35, at 716. 
39.  See id.; see also PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).  
The theory of stakeholder primacy is manifested more in European regulations, which tend to 
hold corporations to higher socially responsible standards than the United States.  See Peter 
Nobel, Social Responsibility of Corporations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1258–59 (1999); 
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Scholars espousing both the shareholder primacy theory and the 
stakeholder primacy theory recognize the role that markets play in 
corporate behavior because of the potential to affect shareholder value 
and the economic value of the corporation.40  Markets can be seen as 
“authentic norms,” gleaned from consumer views and social trends.41  
Corporations, therefore, have economic reason to follow market 
demand, which is often in the form of consumer demand, but can also be 
affected by general societal values.42  
Finally, market pressure also can include pressure from international 
counterparts, both governmental and corporate.  As noted earlier, 
European regulations often are stricter than those of the United States 
in relation to certain issues concerning corporate social responsibility.43  
Stricter regulations elsewhere can result in regulatory arbitrage, with 
capital fleeing toward less regulated markets, but it also can result in 
pressure to raise the global standard.  In other words, organizations like 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
often promulgate global standards for a variety of social regulations, and 
member states—of which the United States is one—are expected to 
have domestic regulations follow the OECD’s guidelines.44  
D. Case Study: Conflict Minerals Legislation 
The conflict minerals provision of Dodd–Frank encourages 
corporate social responsibility through the hybrid of threatened 
 
Mark Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 
102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993). 
40.  Ruth V. Aguilera, Deborah E. Rupp, Cynthia A. Williams & Jyoti Ganapathi, 
Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in 
Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836 (2007). 
41.  Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 150 (1999); see also Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: 
Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 67–68 (2010) (discussing 
extensively “soft-law” or “civil business regulation” that utilizes “private, nonstate, and 
market-based regulatory regimes” to incentivize corporate social responsibility). 
42.  See Dunfee, supra note 41, at 150 (discussing the relevant market constituencies 
which the corporation is obligated to appease). 
43.  See Nobel, supra note 39, at 1258–59; Roe, supra note 39, at 1928; Case Study: 
Corporate Social Responsibility in the US, supra note 9. 
44.  See About the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited June 6, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Z5FK-W28H; Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.o
ecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited June 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/D2
NB-CQ9H. 
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regulatory action as well as market forces.45  Although the provision 
likely will bring about an increase in corporate social responsibility in 
the form of increased transparency in supply chains, it is debatable 
whether the larger goal of the legislative provision will be reached.   
1. Background 
In 2010, Congress passed a provision of Dodd–Frank aimed at 
curbing violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) through 
the reduction of trade in conflict minerals.46  Specifically, section 1502 of 
Dodd–Frank states that Congress recognizes that perpetrators of 
extreme human rights violations are funded by control of mineral mines 
in the eastern region of the DRC;47 therefore, to cut off the funding to 
the rebel groups perpetrating crime, Congress mandated that all 
issuers48 must disclose to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
45.  Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012)).  The term “conflict mineral” is defined to mean “(A) 
columbite-tantalite (coltan) [also known as tantalum], cassiterite [also known as tin ore], gold, 
wolframite [also known as tungsten], or their derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its 
derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an 
adjoining country.”  Id. § 1502(e)(4) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(5)). 
46.  Id. § 1502(a). 
47.  The text of section 1502 makes explicit the congressional goal of the provision: 
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals 
originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict 
characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to an 
emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting the provisions of section 
13(p) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (b).   
Id. 
48.  “Issuer” is defined under Rule 13p-1, which states:  
Every registrant that files reports with the Commission under Sections 13(a) 
(15 U.S.C. 78m(a)) or 15(d) (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)) of the Exchange Act, having conflict 
minerals that are necessary to the functionality or production of a product 
manufactured or contracted by that registrant to be manufactured, shall file a report 
on Form SD within the period specified in that Form disclosing the information 
required by the applicable items of Form SD as specified in that Form (17 CFR 
249b.400). 
17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2014).  This rule, therefore, applies to every issuer required to file 
reports under either Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), including voluntary filers, who must 
comply.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Frequently Asked 
Questions: Conflict Minerals, SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (last modified May 2, 
2014), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/conflictminerals-faq.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K8UH-6ARE.  Furthermore, an issuer must file a disclosure on its behalf as 
well as the subsidiaries included in its consolidated financials.  Id.  Mining activities are 
specifically excluded from the rule because they are not viewed as falling within the definition 
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(SEC) whether their products contain conflict minerals mined in the 
DRC or an adjoining country.49   
Thus, to comply with this disclosure requirement concerning conflict 
minerals, companies with SEC reporting requirements50 must perform 
varying levels of supply chain due diligence to ascertain whether their 
products contain conflict minerals.51  Notably, whether the company 
actually uses conflict minerals is irrelevant to the SEC.  There is no 
penalty for use of conflict minerals but rather for failing to disclose the 
use of conflict minerals.52  In other words, the conflict mineral disclosure 
requirement is simply a dissemination of information—a “name and 
shame” provision.  
2. Disclosure Without Regulatory Sanction 
Because the conflict mineral provision requires merely disclosure 
and not any change in corporate sourcing practices, the practical effect 
of the provision is that the market will provide the pressure to force 
corporate social responsibility on the issue of conflict minerals.  
Granted, companies will have to undertake extensive due diligence on 
their supply chains in order to comply with the provision, but the 
 
of “manufacturing.”  Id.  This exclusion includes the mining of lower grade gold ore, as well as 
the ancillary activities of mining, such as “transporting the mined ore to a processing facility; 
crushing and milling the ore; mixing crushed/milled ore with cyanide solution; floating 
cyanide mixture through a leaching circuit; extracting gold from a leached circuit; [s]melting 
leached gold . . . into ingots or bars . . . ; and transporting the [ingots or bars]” to a refinery for 
refining.  Id. 
49.  Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–14 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)).  “Adjoining countries” include Angola, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Zambia.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(5)). 
50.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A), (2). 
51.  If the conflict minerals in use originated in the DRC or an adjoining country, the 
disclosing party must submit a report to the SEC that includes: (i) a description of the due 
diligence process undertaken by the disclosing party, which must be independently audited, 
with regard to the source and chain of custody of those conflict minerals; and (ii) a description 
of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not “DRC conflict 
free,” the identity of the independent auditor of the source and supply chain, the facilities that 
process the conflict minerals used by the disclosing party, the country from which the conflict 
minerals were obtained, and the efforts used to determine the origin (i.e., the specific mine) 
of the conflict mineral.  Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).  For a product to be considered “DRC 
conflict free,” the product must not contain minerals that finance, directly or indirectly, any 
armed groups in the DRC or adjoining countries.  Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii). 
52.  See Jessica Holzer, Retailers Fight to Escape ‘Conflict Minerals’ Law, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 2, 2010, at B1; Jessica Holzer, SEC Proposes ‘Conflict Mineral’ Report, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 16, 2010, at B9. 
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ultimate presence of conflict minerals in their products does not warrant 
any legal sanction.53  In other words, given the fact that the conflict 
minerals provision is a mere “name and shame” statute, the market, 
rather than the government, is the force asserting pressure on 
companies to responsibly source the four minerals listed in the conflict 
minerals provision of Dodd–Frank.   
Thus, the efficacy of the provision and the potential impact on 
corporate social responsibility turns on the public consciousness and 
reaction to learning that certain corporations have products that contain 
conflict minerals.  This, of course, assumes that not only investors but 
the public at large will review the companies’ websites or SEC 
disclosures to learn whether a particular company has made a conflict 
mineral disclosure.54 
In this way, the mandated corporate social responsibility structure 
related to conflict minerals is a hybrid model of both disclosure and 
market force.  The consumer demand for conflict-free products, 
however, should not be underestimated and has already caused a 
number of multinational corporations to advertise their products as 
conflict-free.55 
 
53.  FIDEL BAFILEMBA, TIMO MUELLER & SASHA LEZHNEV, THE IMPACT OF DODD–
FRANK AND CONFLICT MINERALS REFORMS ON EASTERN CONGO’S CONFLICT 1–2 (2014), 
http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/impact-dodd-frank-and-conflict-minerals-reforms-easte
rn-congo%E2%80%99s-war, archived at http://perma.cc/5KGY-NKYS.  Ostensibly, a 
company can disclose the use of conflict minerals to the SEC, publish the disclosure on the 
company website, and cross its fingers hoping that there is no public backlash that affects its 
bottom line or its brand.  In this situation, the corporate social responsibility initiative 
underlying the statutory provision ultimately falls flat.  There remains, however, the risk of 
penalty for any misstatement made in the conflict minerals disclosure.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2014).  The risk is a potential penalty from the regulatory agency, the SEC, as well as 
potential shareholder liability.  See id.  Because the conflict minerals disclosure is “filed” with 
the SEC, as opposed to merely “furnished,” as it was originally proposed, shareholders are 
able to bring lawsuits based on any misstatement in a corporate filing.  In addition, Rule 10b-
5 provides a private right of action to shareholders injured in the sale or purchase of a security 
by false or misleading statements made by corporate insiders.  See id.  Rule 10b-5 is one of the 
strongest weapons in the SEC’s arsenal because it applies to all corporate statements and not 
just filings.  Id.  The threat of 10b-5 liability alone is sufficient to pressure a company to 
comply with any statutorily required disclosures. 
54.  The SEC regulations require promulgation of the conflict mineral disclosure on the 
corporate website, as well as in a filing with the SEC.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A), (E). 
55.  Intel, for example, had been specifically targeted for the way in which it has handled 
its stance on this legislation and was forced to analyze its supply chain.  See Suzanna 
Fallender, Intel’s Statement on Conflict Minerals Issue, INTEL (May 19, 2010), available at 
http://blogs.intel.com/csr/2010/05/intels_statement_on_conflict_m.php, archived at http://perm
a.cc/Z5TC-3DDY.  Intel initially deleted critical comments on its Facebook page made by 
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Non-governmental organizations and other advocacy groups have 
been lobbying both regulators and consumers in order to create 
increased demand for products that do not contain conflict minerals.56  
As a result, the market is shifting in favor of both compliance with the 
statutory provision, and increased corporate social responsibility and 
transparency in supply chains. 
In sum, regulations aim to give effect to government goals, including 
in the area of corporate social responsibility.  The alternative to 
regulation in advancing these goals is incentivization, considered next.   
III. INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR  
Incentivizing behavior has much precedence, particularly in the tax 
law.57  There are several methods by which to use tax law to achieve 
 
activists over its stance on the conflict mineral legislation.  Jonathan Hutson, Intel Freaks Out, 
Shuts Off Human Rights Protest on Facebook, ENOUGH PROJECT (May 19, 2010), http://www
.enoughproject.org/blogs/intel-freaks-out-shuts-human-rights-protest-facebook, archived at ht
tp://perma.cc/F3WQ-TN24.  After reinstating the deleted comments, Intel released a 
statement that said, “For well over a year, we have been engaged in both conversations with 
NGOs and our own industry focused on creating workable solutions.  We have shared with 
our suppliers our current position on the issue. . . .  We also support the objective of US 
legislation to address this problem.” Fallender, supra (citation omitted).  Intel now is 
heralded by NGOs for being fully onboard with using only conflict-free minerals in its 
products.   
56.  See, e.g., Conflict Minerals, ENOUGH PROJECT, http://www.enoughproject.org/confli
cts/eastern_congo/conflict-minerals#Our_Initiatives (last visited June 6, 2015),  archived at htt
p://perma.cc/E9KZ-6GSW.  One of the most vocal non-governmental organizations has been 
The Enough Project, which regularly promulgates information regarding which companies 
have taken steps to ensure their products do not contain conflict minerals.  See, e.g., 2012 
Conflict Minerals Company Rankings, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, http://www.raisehopeforco
ngo.org/content/conflict-minerals-company-rankings-0 (last visited June 6, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/VD9M-N3SR.  In other words, The Enough Project is expanding the reach of 
the disclosure information in hopes of affecting the market and pressuring companies into 
compliance.  
57.  For example, the Reagan administration developed tax incentives for corporate 
giving.  The purpose was to shift the burden of providing certain social services to the 
charitable sector.  Nancy J. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of Institutional 
Choice and Government Created Charitable Organizations, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 945, 959 
(1997).  But see Peter Dobkin Hall, Business Giving and Social Investment in the United States, 
1790–1995, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 789, 816–17 (1997) (“The decline of corporate social 
responsibility policies and practices after the mid-1980s can be attributed not only to the 
failure of political liberalism, but to the inability of the proponents of business giving and 
social investment to articulate persuasive rationales for such activities. Tax incentives proved 
insufficient to fuel large-scale corporate commitments (as Hayden Smith’s 1983 study shows, 
companies with deep commitments to social responsibility often contributed at levels greater 
than could be justified by tax savings, while companies lacking such commitments did not 
bother to take advantage of potential savings).”).  
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certain congressional goals.  It is true that tax law may be used to collect 
and redistribute the revenues to address corporate social responsibility 
concerns, which does not amount to an incentive because the result will 
be the same no matter how the corporation behaves: the corporation 
will be taxed and the taxation revenue will be redistributed.58  However, 
tax law can also be used to penalize certain actions, which incentivizes 
actors to avoid the penalties.59  Alternatively, tax law may be used to 
incentivize desirable corporate behavior through credits and deductions 
that allow corporations to minimize their tax liability, which will be the 
focus of this Part.  Such tax incentives may be necessary to supplement 
the inherent incentives that exist in the corporate structure, which are 
considered first. 
A. Incentives Inherent to Corporate Structure 
There are certain incentives inherent to the corporate framework, 
many of which result from the corporate duty to maximize profits.  
Profits may be maximized by adding value to the company’s brand, 
appealing to consumers, avoiding regulation, remaining in good 
standing with the local community, and developing a particular 
corporate culture to attract employees.60  Many of these methods for 
profit maximization are advanced by engaging in corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
58.  For a discussion on this topic, see Williams, supra note 35, at 740–50. 
59.  For example, the Affordable Care Act contains a tax penalty for applicable large 
employers who fail to offer full-time employees enrollment in qualifying employer-sponsored 
health coverage, and individuals face a mandate that requires that most Americans obtain 
health insurance or pay a tax penalty.  26 U.S.C. §§ 480H, 5000A; see, e.g., JESSICA BANTHIN, 
ALEXANDRA MINICOZZI, HOLLY HARVEY & SARAH ANDERS, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
(2012), available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/09-19-12-Indiv_Mandate_Penalty.p
df, archived at https://perma.cc/FK36-EQ2V; HINDA CHAIKIND & CHRIS L. PETERSON, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41159, SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES 
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA) (2010), 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/employerpenalties.pdf, archived at http://pe
rma.cc/33CT-8C2Y; David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of 
Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- 
and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 692–700 (2012).  In the child labor 
context, Congress had attempted to penalize employers using child labor with a 10% tax, but 
the United States Supreme Court invalidated this tax, holding it to be an invalid exercise of 
the taxing power, which the Court suspected to be a penalty.  Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 
259 U.S. 20 (1922). 
60.  See Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 33; Ribstein, supra note 10, at 1433–34. 
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This inherent incentive to engage in corporate social responsibility 
stems from the reality that, while corporations are not human, their 
customers are—the recognition of which has driven many corporations 
to cater to people’s desires and preferences as a method of recruiting 
their business and avoiding boycotts.61  In this way, incentives act as the 
converse of the threat of negative market reaction, as discussed in Part 
II.C.  
For example, corporations seek to increase their bottom lines 
through public perception of responsibility.62  The availability of 
external markers of their corporate social responsibility, such as Fortune 
magazine’s “Corporate Social Responsibility” rankings, incentivizes 
them to perform well on such rankings.63  These corporate rankings, 
however, have their shortcomings: companies may misrepresent the 
extent of their social contributions and it is difficult to establish useful 
metrics of social responsibility.64  Nonetheless, they have the ability to 
influence public perception and, therefore, the demand for the 
corporation’s products. 
Thus, businesses and corporations have begun to pursue corporate 
social responsibility under the theory that corporate social responsibility 
 
61.  See Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 33, 48.  “All successful companies aim to 
meet the demands of consumers, and to some degree enjoy a capability to detect and respond 
to market preferences.”  Id. at 48.  For example, “In the face of actual and threatened 
boycotts and consumer activism, Nike improved its labor practices and Pepsi withdrew from 
Burma.”  Diane L. Fahey, Can Tax Policy Stop Human Trafficking?, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 345, 
381 (2009); see also Jonathan Todres, Moving Upstream: The Merits of a Public Health Law 
Approach to Human Trafficking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 447, 505 n.265 (2011).  For a review of the 
Nike litigation, see Vicki McIntyre, Note, Nike v. Kasky: Leaving Corporate America 
Speechless, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1531 (2004). 
62.  See Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 48–49; Fahey, supra note 61, at 381. 
63.  Metcalf, supra note 3, at 196 (suggesting that Fortune magazine’s “Corporate Social 
Responsibility” rankings may encourage large global companies to engage in corporate social 
responsibility).  But see id. at 191 (“Walmart, as a laggard in the 2004–2006 sample, may not 
be ‘disciplined’ by the market if improvements in its ranking would require it to abandon its 
business model based on highly competitive labor conditions, and instead involve labor as a 
stakeholder and promote collective bargaining.”).  The author concedes that “Walmart has 
moved from its ‘laggard’ position at the bottom of the ranking in more recent surveys.”  Id. at 
191 n.144.  
64.  Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 34.  For example, Working Mother magazine 
listed Morgan Stanley in its “100 Best Employers for Working Moms” shortly before Morgan 
Stanley paid $54 million to settle a sex discrimination lawsuit.  Id. at 34 n.7.  
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is good for business.65  It has even become a strategy taught in business 
schools.66   
However, it is unclear whether and to what exact extent these 
inherent incentives exist because it remains unclear whether corporate 
social responsibility metrics predict financial performance.67  To the 
extent that they do not, additional incentives, such as tax incentives, are 
useful. 
B. Tax Incentives  
One of the most effective ways to incentivize behavior is through the 
tax law.68  Although most states have a state corporate tax as well,69 this 
Article limits itself to federal taxation.70   
There is a strong case that tax law can incentivize individuals to act 
in a particular way,71 but the case is particularly strong in the corporate 
 
65.  See Ronen Shamir, Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a New Market-
Embedded Morality?, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 371 (2008). 
66.  Id. at 392 (“[B]usiness schools around the world are now offering programs and 
classes that are based on the business-case approach to social responsibility, encourage 
research and theoretical models which explore the economic incentives for moral 
performance, and measure the business value of being ‘morally right.’”). 
67.  “More than 100 studies have examined whether corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) metrics predict financial performance, with a variety of results . . . .”  Aaron K. 
Chatterji, David I. Levine & Michael W. Toffel, How Well Do Social Ratings Actually 
Measure Corporate Social Responsibility?, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 125, 128 (2009); 
see also Hall, supra note 57, at 794 (“All CEOs understand the public relations value of 
giving.  Most also appreciate the tax savings that can come from the deductibility of 
contributions. However, few regard giving to be in any way related to profitmaking . . . .”). 
68.  “Tax avoidance is as American as apple pie.  Each year, individuals, families, and 
businesses alter their behavior in ways meant to decrease their federal, state, or local tax 
liabilities.”  Jeremy M. Wilson, Recent Development, Statutory Interpretation in Wal-Mart 
Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton and Why North Carolina Courts Should Apply Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Judicial Doctrines in Future Cases, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (2010) (footnote 
omitted).  
69.  Rick Geisenberger, The Delaware Corporation Franchise Tax, DEL. LAW., Fall 
2012, at 18, 20.  For a history of corporate taxation, see Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk 
About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115 (2013). 
70.  But see Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 
DUKE L.J. 1267, 1269 (2013) (arguing that “federal tax incentives also affect the states 
because most states incorporate federal definitions of income into their own tax laws”). 
71.  For the argument that economic incentives drive women’s behavior, see Edward J. 
McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 
40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1033, 1040–41 (1993) (arguing that Congress should lower married 
women’s tax rates to encourage both marriage and married women’s participation in the 
labor force); see also EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 19–23 (1997) (noting that, 
because married couples often view the wife’s income as supplemental, which is taxed at 
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context given the sophistication of corporations, which benefit from 
extensive legal advice in order to minimize taxes.72  Incentivizing 
corporate behavior through the taxation system is therefore an area of 
significant opportunity for legislators.   
There are several ways to incentivize behavior through the taxation 
system: by providing (1) a tax deduction that reduces taxable income73 
or (2) a tax credit that reduces tax liability dollar-for-dollar.74  Congress 
has employed both methods to incentivize certain corporate behavior, in 
addition to exemptions such as the payroll tax exemption.75 
For example, Congress has used tax credits to encourage companies 
to hire certain groups of people in order to boost their employment 
rates.  Specifically, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit provides a tax 
credit for hiring people from certain target groups that have consistently 
 
higher marginal rates, the tax code provides a disincentive for married women to work), and 
Jennifer L. Venghaus, Comment, Tax Incentives: A Means of Encouraging Research and 
Development for Homeland Security?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1220 (2003) (suggesting that 
the tax code can change society’s behavior).  However, other scholars have suggested that the 
tax code does not influence people’s behavior but that people’s behavior influences the tax 
code.  See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
1389, 1392 (1975) (suggesting that the tax code codifies social mores); Erik M. Jensen, 
Jonathan Barry Forman, Making America Work, 5 PITT. TAX REV. 165, 170 n.16 (2008) (book 
review) (suggesting that the tax code is indifferent to whether the husband or wife is the 
primary wage-earner but that social expectations may be more sexist). 
72.  See Mark J. Cowan, A GAAP Critic’s Guide to Corporate Income Taxes, 66 TAX 
LAW. 209, 232 (2012) (“Policymakers also understand the motivation of corporate managers 
to minimize taxes and rely on corporate managers to respond to incentives to engage in 
certain activities—such as investing in new equipment or research and development—put in 
the tax law.”). 
73.  “An example [on tax deductions] may be helpful here.  Assume . . . A . . . [has] paid 
$1000 under [a] local property tax.  Taxpayer A is an itemizer whose income places him in a 
15% marginal rate bracket . . . .  Because A is able to take the [$1000] deduction, A will not 
have to pay $150 in income tax.  A’s property tax expense has been subsidized by the federal 
treasury . . . .”  Mildred Wigfall Robinson, It Takes A Federalist Village: A Revitalized 
Property Tax as the Linchpin for Stable, Effective K-12 Public Education Funding, 17 RICH. 
J.L. & PUB. INT. 549, 582 (2014).  
74.  “Unlike an income tax deduction, a credit is taken after tentative federal income tax 
liability has been determined.  It is a dollar-for-dollar reduction of federal tax liability that 
would otherwise be borne.”  Id. at 583. 
75.  For an excellent review of international tax incentives for corporate social 
responsibility, see Jeyapalan Kasipillai & Shanthy Rachagan, Tax Incentives and Corporate 
Social Responsibility (presented at the International Congress on Innovation and Regional 
Economic Development at the University of Science and Technology of China, Dec. 2–4, 
2012), available at http://congress.ustc.edu.cn/pro/2_.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3JJR-
SQ3U (reviewing tax incentives for corporate social responsibility in Australia, Canada, 
China, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom). 
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faced significant barriers to employment, such as Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) recipients and food stamp recipients.76 
The Indian Employment Tax Credit, meanwhile, incentivizes 
businesses to spur employment on Native American reservations by 
providing a credit if a qualified employee, such as someone who is an 
enrolled member of a Native American tribe or the spouse of such a 
member, is hired and performs substantially all of her services within a 
Native American reservation.  The person also must have her main 
home on or near that reservation.77 
In the wake of the 2007 recession that produced an unemployment 
rate that hovered at 9%,78 the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment 
(HIRE) Act of 2010 included a payroll tax exemption for hiring 
unemployed people, as well as an increased business tax credit, totaling 
billions of dollars in tax breaks.79  This group of tax incentives aims to 
help secure employment for potentially disadvantaged categories of 
Americans.    
Many tax credits also aim to support the hiring of former members 
of the military.  For example, the Activated Military Reservist Tax 
Credit rewards employers with fifty or fewer employees with a 
maximum credit of $4,000 for every employee who is a National Guard 
member or Reservist and whose wages are paid while away on active 
duty for more than thirty days.80  The Wounded Warrior Tax Credit 
 
76.  26 U.S.C. § 51(a), (d) (2012); see also Work Opportunity Tax Credit, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LAB. EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., http://www.doleta.gov/business/incentives/opptax/ (last 
updated Apr. 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3ENZ-W7QX. 
77.  26 U.S.C. § 45A; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
PUBLICATION 954: TAX INCENTIVES FOR DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES 26 (2004), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p954--2004.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K56W-P92H.  For 
an overview of taxation and Native American issues, see Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in 
Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem and Analyzing the Role of the Federal Government in 
Protecting Tribal Government Revenues, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 93 (2005). 
78.  See, e.g., Andrew J. Kazakes, Developments in the Law, Protecting Absent 
Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and 
State Court Responses, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1383, 1393 & n.42 (2010); Labor Force Statistics 
from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,  http://dat
a.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited June 7, 2013), archived  at  http://perma.cc/Z3Y
N-XJAT. 
79.  Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No.111-147, §§ 101, 102, 124 
Stat. 71, 72–76 (2010). 
80.  26 U.S.C. § 45P; see also CTR. FOR AM., 2013 FEDERAL TAX BENEFITS FOR HIRING 
AND EMPLOYING QUALIFIED VETERANS, NATIONAL GUARD MEMBERS AND RESERVISTS 
12−13 (2013), available at http://www.centerforamerica.org/pledge/ng/AJAH_2013_Federal_T
ax_Benefits_for_Hiring_Veterans.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5YU6-UTN8. 
 1686 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1667 
provides a tax credit of several thousand dollars to businesses that hire 
veterans with service-related disabilities.81  Additionally, “the Returning 
Heroes Tax Credit encourages the hiring of unemployed Gulf War-era 
II veterans.”82   
In addition to these tax incentives for hiring certain groups of 
people, there are tax credits to encourage investment in certain 
underperforming communities.83  For example, the New Markets Tax 
Credit provides a tax credit to individual and corporate investors for 
making equity investments in Community Development Entities 
(CDEs), which are specialized financial institutions.84  In providing the 
tax credit in 2000, Congress aimed to increase investments into 
businesses and real estate projects located in low-income communities, 
determining that a qualified CDE is any U.S. corporation or partnership 
that meets the following criteria: Its “primary mission” is to serve or 
provide investment capital for low-income communities or people; it 
“maintains accountability to residents of low-income communities 
through . . . representation on any” governing or advisory boards of the 
entity; and it is certified by the CDFI Fund of the Department of the 
Treasury.85 
Similarly, the Empowerment Zone and Renewal Community 
Employment Tax Credit encourages employers to hire individuals who 
work and live in an empowerment zone or a renewal community, both 
of which are federal designations for highly distressed areas with high 
 
81.  26 U.S.C. § 51; see also CTR. FOR AM., supra note 80, at 8–11. 
82.  Marcy L. Karin & Katie Onachila, The Military’s Workplace Flexibility Framework, 
3 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 153, 178 (2013) (providing a discussion of the legal framework on 
hiring former members of the military). 
83.  Commentators have urged the federal government to focus on this issue.  See, e.g., 
Jesse J. Norris, State Efforts to Reduce Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice: Empirical 
Analysis and Recommendations for Action, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 493, 500 (2011) (“The need for 
greater investment in poor communities . . . is a complex policy question that, despite its 
urgency, could be addressed in a number of different ways.  Even so, if state-level anti-
disparities processes are earnestly committed to reducing disparities, they must address this 
issue.  Unfortunately, this article shows that most of these processes are, in fact, neglecting 
the need for more services.”); Jasmin Sethi, Lessons for Social Scientists and Politicians: An 
Analysis of Welfare Reform, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 5, 31 (2010) (“[William 
Julius Wilson’s] work implied that a substantive change in outcomes required improved social 
organization in poor neighborhoods and significant investment in poor communities by the 
federal government.”). 
84.  26 U.S.C. § 45D. 
85.  See id.; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 
77, at 18; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT 5–6 (2010), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/atgnmtc.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2YUY-VNZS. 
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levels of poverty and emigration.86  Empowerment zones include 
Tucson, Arizona; Cleveland, Ohio; Knoxville, Tennessee; Fresno, 
California; and Detroit, Michigan; while renewal communities include 
Chicago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; New Orleans, Louisiana; Flint, 
Michigan; and Youngstown, Ohio.87  
Finally, the Disabled Access Tax Credit provides a non-refundable 
credit for small businesses that incur expenditures for providing access 
to people with disabilities.88  Eligible expenses include readers for 
customers or employees who have trouble with sight, sign language 
interpreters for those who are hard of hearing, adaptive equipment, 
removal of architectural barriers in facilities or vehicles, and certain fees 
for consulting services.89 
These are several examples of tax credits being used to incentivize 
businesses to act in desirable ways toward certain groups of people and 
communities.  The other major category of incentives takes the form of 
tax deductions.  Credits are more favorable to a taxpayer than 
deductions because they reduce tax liability dollar for dollar,90 but 
deductions also reduce liability.   
There have been several deductions offered to corporate taxpayers 
to encourage certain behavior.91  For example, the Charitable 
Contribution Tax Deduction allows businesses to deduct their charitable 
contributions to qualified organizations.92  This deduction allows 
businesses to reduce their taxable income by donating funds or property 
 
86.  26 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1400H; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., supra note 77, at 3, 8. 
87.  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 77, at 3–4. 
88.  26 U.S.C. § 44; Tax Benefits for Businesses Who Have Employees with Disabilities, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Empl
oyed/Tax-Benefits-for-Businesses-Who-Have-Employees-with-Disabilities (last updated Jan. 
13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A4H4-G4SK. 
89.  26 U.S.C. § 44(c)(2); Tax Incentives for Businesses, MID-ATLANTIC ADA CENTER, 
http://www.adainfo.org/content/tax-incentives-businesses (last visited June 7, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/9WUA-TWWE. 
90.  Roberton Williams, Income Tax Issues: What is the Difference Between Tax 
Deductions and Tax Credits?, TAX POL’Y CENTER (Sept. 26, 2011),  http://www.taxpolicycent
er.org/briefing-book/background/issues/credits.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/M9GA-FRJ3. 
91.  See supra Part III.B. 
92.  26 U.S.C. § 170.  Individual taxpayers also benefit from this charitable deduction.  
Id. 
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to charities.93  Charitable giving is incentivized through tax deductions 
on both the business and individual levels.94  
Meanwhile, the Architectural Barrier Removal Tax Deduction 
incentivizes businesses to remove architectural and transportation 
barriers for the elderly and people with disabilities.95  Businesses may 
use this deduction in addition to the Disabled Access Credit in the same 
tax year if both are applicable.96  If a business avails itself of both the 
deduction and the credit, “the deduction is equal to the difference 
between the total expenditures and the amount of the credit claimed.”97  
Examples of deductible expenditures include those incurred to widen 
doors, install ramps, restripe parking lots, and modify vehicles.98   
Therefore, many tax incentives exist to encourage certain corporate 
behavior that benefits the community.  Some of these incentivized 
behaviors fall strictly in the corporate social responsibility rubric, others 
do so more loosely.99  Either way, they achieve Congressional goals of 
directing and shaping certain corporate behavior.   
C. Theoretical Justifications 
Tax incentives are effective because corporate management has the 
responsibility to shareholders to minimize tax liability.100  Scholars have 
 
93.  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS 2 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p526.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JWQ2-57X5. 
94.  For both individuals and businesses, the tax-expenditure estimate for charitable 
deductions in 2009 totaled over $40 billion.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 301 tbl.19-1 
(2009), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/sp
ec.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/WV65-Y7VB.  Furthermore, certain non-profit 
organizations are exempt from tax.  See Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561, 1568 (2013). 
95.  26 U.S.C. § 190. 
96.  Tax Benefits for Businesses Who Have Employees with Disabilities, supra note 88. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Tax Incentives for Businesses, supra note 89. 
99.  See supra Part I for examples of corporate social responsibility. 
100.  See Cowan, supra note 72, at 231–32 (“Any residual tax burden that cannot be 
passed on to workers, suppliers, and customers—or other ‘outsiders’—presumably falls on 
the shareholders. To keep the shareholders happy, corporate managers must engage in tax 
planning to minimize this cost and enhance shareholder value.  Indeed, shareholders have 
been known to litigate if they perceive that managers have not minimized corporate taxes.”).  
But see Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate 
Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835, 836 (1997) (“The Internal Revenue Code has 
fossilized a conception of the corporation as a ‘real entity.’  It generally treats that entity like 
 
 2015] MANDATING VERSUS INCENTIVIZING 1689 
pointed out that this method of encouraging the private sector to engage 
in charitable activities the state cannot handle is no less legitimate than 
taxing corporations and then regulating corporate social 
responsibility.101   
To every tax incentive, there is a corresponding cost resulting from 
the foregone tax revenue.102  However, unless obtained through 
lobbying,103 the cost is borne because of the value placed on the 
incentivized behavior.104  For example, the charitable giving tax 
incentive has been criticized for its cost, but its continued existence has 
been justified by the value placed on charitable giving.105 
 
any other taxable person, but it presumes that the entity is ‘the classic profit maximizer in 
collective form.’  According to the tax law, a corporation earns its own income and pays its 
own tax.  Treating the corporation as a real entity serves important practical goals: it eases 
administration and allows form to control the tax consequences of many corporate 
transactions, thereby improving predictability for taxpayers.  Developments in corporate 
theory, however, challenge this conception of the corporation.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1490 (1989))). 
101.  Reuven Avi-Yonah, Taxation, Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Business 
Enterprise (Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper 19/2009).  Avi-
Yonah investigates tax incentives for corporate social responsibility under three different 
views of corporations: as an artificial entity, as a real entity, and as a nexus of contracts.  Id.  
102.  “We suspect that few people really oppose all efforts by corporations to minimize 
their tax liability or improve their financial appearance—the problem is when they go too 
far.”  Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Of the Conditional Fee as a Response to Lawyers, 
Bankers and Loopholes, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 42, 47, n.17 (2011) (emphasis omitted). 
103.  Businesses and industries spend many resources lobbying for tax incentives.  See, 
e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private 
Lands, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 453, 458 (2002) (“[L]and trusts have been increasingly active in 
lobbying for even greater tax incentives to encourage both the donation and sale of 
conservation easements, and lawmakers appear to be increasingly receptive to their pleas.”); 
Eric Homsi, Comment, Financing Films One State at a Time: A Survey of Successful Film 
Incentive Programs, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 149, 151 (2011) (reviewing the 
American film and television production industries’ lobbying efforts for “incentives to 
prevent further runaway productions and to maintain the industry’s beneficial impact on the 
American economy”). 
104.  One commentator proposed the following framework for evaluating tax incentives: 
“If, however, lobbyist-legislator-advocates claim that tax breaks provide a tax incentive, the 
tax break must be held to a higher standard: Does the tax incentive help the economy? . . .  [It 
does] if its economic benefits outweigh its economic costs.”  Martin A. Sullivan, Tax 
Incentives and Economists, 111 ST. TAX NOTES 20, 26 (2006). 
105.  See, e.g., Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: Domestic 
Activities, Foreign Activities, or None of the Above, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361, 404 (2012) (“[T]he 
current regime for charitable deductions creates value, but perhaps not enough value for its 
costs, broadly defined.”); Grace Soyon Lee, Mitigating the Effects of an Economic Downturn 
on Charitable Contributions: Facing the Problem and Contemplating Solutions, 22 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 589, 609–612 (2013) (outlining the criticisms of the charitable deduction).  
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Similarly, corporate social responsibility is valued and subsidized.  
For example, the hiring of certain groups of people is valued to the 
extent that its costs are subsidized through the tax code.  In other words, 
advancing these public policy goals has been deemed worth the 
foregone tax revenue.  In this way, the government has been 
characterized as a partner in the business by foregoing certain tax 
revenues.106  
Of course, the effectiveness of the tax incentives requires that 
corporations have tax liability that they seek to minimize.  This requires 
making the important distinction between minimizing tax liability and 
tax avoidance.  As corporations endeavor to avoid taxation by 
geography or the structure of their transactions, the tax base decreases 
and tax incentives become less effective because no tax liability needs to 
be minimized.107  However, to the extent that income exists, 
corporations will seek to minimize their tax liability and the government 
can take advantage of this known goal through tax incentives for certain 
corporate behavior.    
IV. THE FRAMEWORK ON WHETHER TO LEGISLATE OR INCENTIVIZE 
Observers have called for tax incentives and for corporate 
regulations for certain corporate behaviors.108  But what is the 
framework that should govern whether Congress legislates or 
incentivizes behavior?109  Regulation and incentives have different levels 
 
But see Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Compromising the Safety Net: How Limiting Tax Deductions for 
High-Income Donors Could Undermine Charitable Organizations, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
329 (2013) (noting the importance of the charitable deduction to giving).   
106.  Cowan, supra note 72, at 237 (reviewing the literature likening the government to a 
shareholder by virtue of its right to a share of corporate revenue through taxation).  “But the 
government’s position is different from that of private shareholders in at least seven ways.”  
Id. 
107.  For a history of corporate taxation and the ways in which corporations seek to 
avoid it, see John T. VanDenburgh, Note, Closing International Loopholes: Changing the 
Corporate Tax Base to Effectively Combat Tax Avoidance, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 313 (2012); see 
also Joann M. Weiner, An Economist’s View of Income Allocation Under the Arm’s Length 
Standard and Under Formulary Appointment, in THE STATE AND LOCAL TAX LAWYER—
2009/10 SYMPOSIUM EDITION, at 25, 29 (2013) (“To minimize their overall tax liability, 
multinational corporations have an incentive to attribute income to low-tax jurisdictions and 
to attribute expenses to high-tax jurisdictions.”).   
108.  E.g., Arthur Acevedo, Responsible Profitability? Not On My Balance Sheet!,  61 
CATH. U. L. REV. 651, 693–95 (2012). 
109.  Id. at 693 (arguing that Congress should use tax law to encourage corporations to 
engage in socially responsible behavior, specifically related to products liability).  
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of effectiveness depending on the desired behavior.  Also, the nature of 
the desired corporate behavior may preclude regulation, leaving 
incentives as the best method of achieving such behavior.  These issues 
are considered next. 
A. Legality 
There are certain corporate behaviors not amenable to regulation.  
These areas are the easiest candidates for tax incentives, which are the 
only way to achieve desired corporate behavior if regulation is not 
possible.   
For example, while corporations may not discriminate, they cannot 
be told whom to hire.110  This is clear territory where tax incentives may 
fill the legislative gap necessarily in existence.  Accordingly, several tax 
incentives exist to hire from certain groups of people.111  
Similarly, government cannot legislate in which geographical areas a 
corporation must hire.  In fact, there arises competition among 
jurisdictions to attract business through their tax law.112  Again, this is 
where tax incentives fill the legislative void,113 and tax incentives have 
arisen to encourage hiring from certain communities.114  
Government also cannot legislate where businesses invest their 
money, short of taxing them and redistributing the tax revenues.  On the 
other hand, government can incentivize companies through tax law to 
invest in certain underperforming geographical areas.  This is the reason 
for tax incentives that encourage businesses to invest in certain areas, 
 
110.  See Employers and the ADA: Myth and Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. OFFICE OF 
DISABILITY EMP. POL’Y, http://www.dol.gov/odep/pubs/fact/ada.htm (last visited June 7, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/966F-X3GD.  There is a network of federal laws preventing 
discrimination in hiring, including the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, as well as The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) that prohibits discrimination against 
people over 40 years old.  For further information on these laws and others enforced by the 
federal government, see Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION,  available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/ (last visited June 7, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/F3QA-95GJ. 
111.  See supra Part III.B.  
112.  The competition among the states for filmmaking business is an example.  See, e.g., 
Schuyler M. Moore, The Future of Money, L.A. LAW., May 2013, at 20, 26 (“The most 
important development in film financing over the last decade is the drastic expansion of state 
tax credits for film production.  Revelations used this approach to obtain New York tax 
credits for The Magic of Belle Isle.”). 
113.  See supra Part III.B.  
114.  See supra Part III.B. 
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such as the Empowerment Zone and Renewal Community Employment 
Tax Credit.115 
Increasing accessibility to people with disabilities is an area where 
Congress has chosen to both legislate and incentivize behavior.  
Specifically, while Congress has legislated certain minimal standards of 
accessibility for people with disabilities, further accommodations are 
incentivized through the tax law, such as the Disabled Access Tax 
Credit.116  This increases the response to the issue. 
There are also plenty of areas where Congress may legislate, but 
such legislation may be out of place.  This may be the case of conflict 
minerals.  Specifically, a sole humanitarian provision in the context of 
financial reform such as Dodd–Frank seems inconsistent.  Moreover, 
the stated aim of the conflict minerals provision is a reduction in 
violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo,117 yet Congress requires 
only mere disclosure by companies with reporting requirements to the 
SEC and no actual penalty for use of conflict minerals.118  In other 
words, the conflict mineral legislation, while ambitious in shaping 
corporate social responsibility, likely will not be able to produce a 
measurable effect on its underlying goal of reducing violence in the 
DRC.  While market forces could pressure companies into acting 
responsibly, it is possible that Congress would have gotten more buy-in 
and participation from both public and private corporations if it had 
offered tax incentives rather than regulations tied to SEC reporting 
requirements.  
B. Effectiveness 
No doubt, there are frequent breaches of corporate social 
responsibility, especially when corporate social responsibility is neither 
regulated nor incentivized.119  Many of these breaches result from the 
 
115.  See supra Part III.B.  
116.  See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.  For example, the 1973 
Rehabilitation Act, section 504, requires a recipient of federal funds to “make reasonable 
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
handicapped applicant or employee unless the . . . accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of [the employer’s] program or activity.”  34 C.F.R. § 104.12(b) 
(2011). 
117.  Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010). 
118.  Id. § 1502(b)(1)(A) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A) (2012). 
119.  See Craig Mackenzie, Boards, Incentives and Corporate Social Responsibility: The 
Case for a Change of Emphasis, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 935 (2007) (drawing 
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nature of the corporate framework, which pursues maximization of 
profits.  This has certain lessons for the effectiveness of regulation 
versus incentives.    
Corporations seek to circumvent regulations if the regulations 
conflict with profit maximization, as they often do.120  When 
corporations are effective in dodging regulations, they are able to 
undermine the intent of the regulations.  One way to avoid this effect is 
to incentivize particular behavior instead of regulating it.   
Corporations also seek to circumvent taxes,121 which is why 
opportunities to lower tax burdens through tax incentives are effective.  
Whereas it is difficult to harness corporate avoidance of regulations into 
productive results, it is easy to harness corporate avoidance of taxes by 
offering tax incentives.   
A major exception to the corporation’s primary duty to maximize 
profits for shareholders122 is the case wherein the shareholders value 
corporate social responsibility in itself.123  There has been some 
movement toward socially responsible investing, where investors buy 
stock based in part on the company’s record in the social, ethical, 
 
upon economic theories to analyze the primary causes of breaches of corporate social 
responsibility). 
120.  “[C]orporations have a strong inclination to resist, co-opt, or preempt government 
directives, and . . . the spread of economic globalization has made it even easier for 
corporations to avoid governments altogether.”  Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 41; see 
also Hill & Painter, supra note 102, at 42 (noting that “loophole lawyering” makes regulating 
corporations difficult). 
121.  See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clayton, 147 S.E.2d 522, 529 (N.C. 1966) (“[E]xploring 
ways [for the corporation] to minimize taxes is as much a part of its business as exploring for 
new sources of oil.”); see also Cowan, supra note 72, at 235 (“Given the high stakes and high 
profile of tax planning—especially effective tax rate planning—corporations spend billions 
on in-house tax departments and tax consulting advice.”).   
122.  See Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 34 (arguing that advocates of corporate 
social responsibilities need to remember the function of the corporation).  But see Susan S. 
Kuo & Benjamin Means, Corporate Social Responsibility After Disaster, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 
973, 977 (2012) (arguing that the “standard story concerning corporate social responsibility is 
incomplete because it features only the largest, publicly traded corporations” and not “closely 
held, locally owned businesses, whether corporations, LLCs, or even franchise establishments 
with owners who reside in the community”).   
123.  “Managers can promote shareholders’ interests without maximizing profits to the 
extent the shareholders have some objective other than profit maximization.”  Ribstein, supra 
note 10, at 1433.  The question also is to what extent is society’s interests consistent with those 
of shareholders?  Id. 
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environmental, or political realms.124  Nonetheless, the significant 
number, turnover, and anonymity of shareholders of public 
corporations, whose stock trades on an exchange, result in the operation 
of the assumption that shareholders want maximum profit.  This has 
prompted debate over whether corporate social responsibility is even 
possible.  Indeed, “[f]or centuries legal, political, social, and economic 
commentators have debated corporate social responsibility ad 
nauseam.”125 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the choice of whether to incentivize or regulate corporate 
behavior, legislators must decide how to achieve certain desirable 
behavior.  This question arises often in the context of corporate social 
responsibility.  This Article has proposed a framework in which to make 
these types of decisions, evaluating examples of both approaches.   
Ultimately, the decision whether to legislate certain corporate 
behavior or incentivize it depends on whether regulation is even 
possible and, if it is, whether it would be effective.  The subject of the 
regulation or incentive helps determine which method would be possible 
and effective.  For example, certain subjects are beyond the scope of 
regulation—such as where or whom a corporation may hire—and 
certain subjects are unusual for regulation.  These are ideal areas for 
incentivizing corporate behavior to achieve desired corporate behavior. 
 
124.  Siebecker, supra note 18, at 623.  Siebecker cites the public’s willingness to pay a 
premium for “socially sound business practices” as a monetary incentive for corporations to 
engage in corporate social responsibility.  Id. at 624. 
125.  Butler & McChesney, supra note 1, at 1195 (emphasis omitted). 
